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Abstract: 
‘Feminisation’ in International Relations refers to multiple, and sometimes 
contradictory, concepts.  Much of the time it refers to the incorporation of women into 
various organisations and institutions, such as women’s participation in militaries or 
in politics.  The decline of violence, or declinist, literature lists it as one of the 
contributing factors in the decline of violence and associates feminisation with 
women’s social, political, and economic empowerment.  Feminist theory in IR, 
however, conceptualises ‘feminisation’ in a different light.  As the feminine is often 
devalued or deprioritised for the preferred masculine, feminisation is synonymous 
with devalourisation.1  Therefore, this paper will play with the dual meaning of 
feminisation, offering a cautionary tale for the dependency on women’s 
empowerment in the declinist literature by asserting that it is hampered by masculinist 
thinking.  It will do so by challenging the equation of women with gender in the 
declinist literature.  Gender equality and/or progress cannot simply be limited to 
raising women’s status, which implicates an understanding of gender as a binary 
categorisation of men/masculinity or women/femininity.  Instead, gender is a 
spectrum that understands the multitude of gender identities, going beyond 
heteronormativity to lesbian, bi-, gay, trans, queer, and intersex (LBGTQI).  Limiting 
gender to women means violences against other communities, particularly sexual 
minorities, is unrecognised and unaccounted for. 
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‘Feminisation’ in International Relations refers to multiple, and sometimes 
contradictory, concepts.  Much of the time it refers to the incorporation of women into 
various organisations and institutions, such as women’s participation in militaries or 
in politics.  The decline of violence, or declinist, literature lists it as one of the 
contributing factors in the decline of violence and associates feminisation with 
women’s social, political, and economic empowerment.  Feminist theory in IR, 
                                                 
1 V. Spike Peterson, ‘Feminist Theories Within, Invisible to, and Beyond IR’, Brown 
Journal of World Affairs, 10 (2003). 
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however, conceptualises ‘feminisation’ in a different light.  As the feminine is often 
devalued or deprioritised for the preferred masculine, feminisation is synonymous 
with devalourisation.2  Therefore, this paper will play with the dual meaning of 
feminisation, offering a cautionary tale for the dependency on women’s 
empowerment in the declinist literature by asserting that it is hampered by masculinist 
thinking.  It will do so by challenging the equation of women with gender in the 
declinist literature.  Gender equality and/or progress cannot simply be limited to 
raising women’s status, which implicates an understanding of gender as a binary 
categorisation of men/masculinity or women/femininity.  Instead, gender is a 
spectrum that understands the multitude of gender identities, going beyond 
heteronormativity to lesbian, bi-, gay, trans, queer, and intersex (LBGTQI).  Limiting 
gender to women means violences against other communities, particularly sexual 
minorities, is unrecognised and unaccounted for. 
 
The decline of violence literature is most closely associated with Steven Pinker3, 
Joshua Goldstein4, and Nils Petter Gleditsch’s5 scholarship.  Together this scholarship 
challenges one of the fundamental assumptions of post-Cold War IR: that civilian 
death in war now outnumbers combatant death eight-to-one.6  Arguing that this was a 
                                                 
2 V. Spike Peterson, ‘Feminist Theories Within, Invisible to, and Beyond IR’, Brown 
Journal of World Affairs, 10 (2003). 
3 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History 
and Its Causes (London: Penguin, 2011) 
4 Joshua S. Goldstein, Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict 
Worldwide (London: Penguin, 2011). 
5 Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, ‘Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A 
New Dataset of Battle Deaths’, European Journal of Population, 21/2-3 (2005): pp. 
145-166; Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta 
Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand, ‘Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset’, 
Journal of Peace Research, 39/5 (2002): pp. 615-637. 
6 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (London: 
Polity, 1999. 
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miscalculation, the declinist literature gives scholars of war hope that something is 
forcing a shift in war-making and fighting.  While there are multiple, inter-connected 
proposed reasons for this, one such rationale is the aforementioned ‘feminisation’.  
This argument coheres with the women=peace thesis, one that Francis Fukuyama 
(somewhat, as it never really went away) revived and championed in a controversial 
1998 Foreign Affairs article.7  It is a proposition that has had traction in recent 
research, including the work of Valerie Hudson in which she argues that women’s 
security is correlated to regional security.8  Others argue that women’s economic 
empowerment is also an indicator of both societal security and economic 
development.9 
 
The declinist argument and the associated literature are right to identify women's 
empowerment/feminisation as a contributing force.  However, they are reliant upon 
Western masculinist presuppositions, which work to reify a Western-centric notion of 
security, empowerment, and development that erases gender structures/constructions 
and intersectional politics.  The feminisation argument is reliant upon legal and 
bureaucratic changes to stand for actual socio-structural changes—in effect forcing 
gender equality from the top-down and not encouraging or accounting for 
dispositional changes about the lived realities of gender hierarchies.  This means that 
the declinist feminisation argument is possibly headed for failure as it unwittingly 
props up the current gender hierarchy without effecting lasting change.  In other 
words, because ‘woman/women’ is being made to stand for ‘gender’, when other 
                                                 
7 Francis Fukuyama, ‘Women and the Evolution of World Politics’, Foreign Affairs, 
77/5 (1998). 
8 Valerie M. Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli, Chad F. Emmett, Sex 
and World Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
9 Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn, Half the Sky: Turning Oppression into 
Opportunity for Women Worldwide (New York: Vintage Books, 2010). 
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gendered violences are (finally) recognised (like homophobic or transphobic attacks) 
and affect peace measurements, does this mean ‘feminisation’ will be seen to have 
failed?  Declinist literature is already critiqued for failing to integrate violences that 
fall outside of the confines of its methodology, including sexual and gender-based 
violence10 and structural violence.11  Changing the declinist conceptualisation of 
feminisation by taking a more holistic account of empowerment, inclusive of non-
binary gender identities and diverse sexualities, would be more productive.  
 
Therefore, this paper will focus on the vulnerability of the LBGTQI community not 
just globally but more specifically in the United States.  While the International Gay, 
Lesbian, and Transgender Agency (ILGA) highlights the spectrum of LGBTQI rights 
secured (or not) worldwide, this fails to acknowledge the high-levels of violence 
against this community.  Legal rights, such as marriage equality, do not equate to 
personal and social security.  Indeed, the conventional wisdom holds that as rights are 
secured for marginalized and vulnerable communities violent backlashes are 
probable.12  For example, whereas the United States has technically granted this 
community the highest level of rights—marriage—violence towards the community 
happens across the country and has been steadily increasing, particularly against 
transgender people of colour.  
 
                                                 
10 Jacqui True, ‘Winning the Battle but Losing the War on Violence’, International 
Feminist Journal of Politics, 17/4 (2015): pp. 554-572. 
11 John Gray, ‘Steven Pinker is Wrong About Violence and War’, The Guardian, 13 
March 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/mar/13/john-gray-steven-
pinker-wrong-violence-war-declining accessed 16 September 2015. 
12 Lucas Grindley, ‘We Saw the Backlash Coming, But Have You Really Notice All 
of It?’, The Advocate, 1 April 2016, 
http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2016/4/01/we-saw-backlash-coming-have-
you-really-noticed-all-it accessed 17 May 2016. 
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This paper will explore the ‘duel’ meaning by bringing the two literatures on 
feminisation together through the juxtaposition of the post-colonial writings on 
modernity, particularly by Dipesh Chakrabarty.13  In his article and subsequent book, 
Provincialising Europe, Chakrabarty first argues that European/Western societies and 
governments are the model to which all other states are held in comparison.  
Furthermore, he explores how women in colonised societies are held as the bellwether 
for progress and modernisation.  In order to demonstrate the applicability of a post-
colonial perspective, the paper first examines the declinist literature on feminisation is 
tied to neo-liberal Western expectations.  After a deeper exploration of how women 
are often used as social standard bearers in modern Western thinking.  The paper then 
looks at the feminist literature on ‘feminisation’.  It concludes that while it is helpful 
that the declinist literature emphasises women’s rights and empowerment it does so 
by problematically conflating women with gender and then saying that the rise of 
women indicates gender progress when gender progress is so much more than this.  
This is evidenced through the endemic violence against the LGBTQI community not 
just worldwide but in the United States. 
 
Gendered Peace, Feminisation, and the Decline of Violence 
 
The women=peace thesis is dependent upon the gender binary, stemming from the 
Greek patriarchy, that men are more independent, rational, and assertive and women 
                                                 
13 Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘Provincialising Europe: Postcoloniality and the Critique of 
History’, Cultural Studies, 6/3 (1992); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincialising Europe: 
Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press 2000). 
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are inherently more nurturing, emotional, and passive.14  This of course helped to 
create and maintain the division of the public/private spheres, where men are 
associated with government, war, and business and women home-making and child-
rearing.15  Jean Bethke Elshtain looks at how the gender binary operates in war 
through the Hegelian conceptualisation of men as ‘Just Warriors’ and women as the 
‘Beautiful Souls’ that the Just Warriors fight to protect.16  This has further 
implications for how citizenship is conceived: a good citizen is one who is able to die 
defending the state.  If women are left out of this war-citizen matrix, women are 
unable to be good citizens.17  Thus, women’s association with the ‘Beautiful Soul’ 
narrative is circular: women’s supposedly essentialist peaceful dispositions barred 
them from the military and hence full entry into material or epistemological 
understandings of citizenship thereby reinforcing their place in the private sphere.   
 
Instead of offering an alternative way of seeing gendered bodies, Elshtain’s 
overarching argument in Women and War (1987) holds that these differences between 
women and men’s role within society should be implicated equally in the value of 
their citizenship. Therefore, rather unfortunately, Elshtain continues to reify the 
binary between bodies gendered only as men and women, failing to take into account 
the different range of experiences different bodies/individuals, from cis-gender to 
queer, have as well as fully engaging and dismantling the gender hierarchical 
structure. While her work examined in this section are more than likely not 
                                                 
14 Peter Beckman and Francine D’Amico, Women, Gender, and World Politics 
(Westport: Greenwood, 1994): p. 3. 
15 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political 
Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981). 
16 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Women and War (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 
1987). 
17 Elshtain, Women and War. 
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biologically essentialist, unfortunate echoes linger. Masculine or feminine 
characteristics that feminists and poststructuralists would see as socially constructed, 
such as women are innately peaceful and men are innately prone to violence, are 
taken as a given in biological essentialism.  
 
Elshtain’s argument sustains the women=peace thesis.  It is a sentiment that Francis 
Fukuyama picked up on in a 1998 Foreign Affairs article.  He finds that there are 
sociobiological reasons behind women’s inherent peacefulness, which are 
independent of gender structures, and that  
[a] world run by women would follow different rules…and it is toward that 
sort of world that all postindustrial or Western societies are moving.  As 
women gain power in these countries, the latter should become less 
aggressive, adventurous, competitive, and violent.18   
 
He terms this ‘rise’ the ‘feminisation’ of world politics: ‘women have won the right to 
vote and participate in politics in all developed counties, as well as in many 
developing countries, and have exercised that right with incredible energy’.19  These 
empowered women are less supportive of wars, defence spending, and the use of 
force abroad (in the US at least).20  While Fukuyama is less positive about men’s 
ability to be peaceable, he believes ‘democracy and modern capitalism…ope[n] up 
many more peaceful channels for satisfying’ a desire for hierarchy.21  Thus, 
feminisation in declinist literature is tied with Western ideas about modernisation, 
economic (capitalist) progress, and good democratic governance. Before 
                                                 
18 Fukuyama, ‘Women’, p. 27. 
19 ibid.,34. 
20 ibid., 34 
21 ibid., 40 
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demonstrating in the next section how such gender essentialisation reifies problematic 
gender hierarchies, I wish to clarify how the women=peace thesis continues to 
influence approaches to international politics and development. 
 
Feminisation in Declinist Literature 
 
This section serves as an overview of ‘feminisation’ in the declinist literature. Most of 
the authors covered in this section argue that empowering women through voting 
rights, the provision of physical security, and economic inclusion will enable societies 
and states to progress and stabilise.22 These are all encapsulated within policies like 
the Hillary Doctrine, UNSCR 1325, and development projects.  Together, the 
declinist literature makes feminisation dependent upon a neo-liberal perspective 
because women’s empowerment and individual security is seen as being achieved 
through democratic participation and capitalist economic empowerment.  These are 
all achievements to be lauded, yet, these presume that political and economic 
liberalisation is the best means of achieving peace,23 which then leads to an erasure of 
certain types of violence.  This erasure is made deeper when gender is conflated 
women, which means gender violence, like cis-gender idealisations that drive 
homophobic attacks, is unseen in the realm of declinist feminisation. 
 
Feminisation is as much about legal rights as it is about economic ones.  For instance, 
Steve Pinker attributes feminisation to four processes, including political 
                                                 
22 Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature; Hudson et al., Sex and World Peace; 
Kristof and WuDunn, Half the Sky. 
23 Such thinking has already been problematised by the ‘liberal peace critique’ 
proffered by Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty. (Oliver Richmond, A Post-
Liberal Peace [London: Routledge, 2012]; Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Indigenous Peace-
Making Versus the Liberal Peace’, Cooperation and Conflict, 43/2 [2008]: 139-163). 
 9 
empowerment, the declining emphasis on male honour, women’s increased ability to 
make their own marital choices, and women’s reproductive rights.24  Women’s 
economic empowerment has become a common phrase and motivation in 
development circles.  Women’s lack of education and absence from the labour market 
is detrimental not just to women’s own social standing but it also holds the state 
economy back.25  Thus, the international development community has placed a 
greater emphasis on helping women enter the labour market, believing such changes 
lead to women’s empowerment.26   
 
Empowerment and the rights of women is reflected in how much women can expect 
to have their bodily person and integrity respected by the law, arguably leading to 
decline in violence against women.27  Economic empowerment limits the effects of 
‘everyday violences,’ or the often overlooked violences against women that include 
rape, sex slavery, genital mutilation, and that these work in tandem to eradicate global 
poverty.28  Other scholars connect women’s activism, which may come in a context, 
or not, of political and social rights, to the creation of security.  Making a similar 
argument to Fukuyama’s, in Winning the War on War Goldstein pays particular 
attention to the role women play in peace-making and conflict resolution.  He traces 
out how women’s peace activism has shaped world affairs with a focus on the UN’s 
1995 Fourth Conference on Women in Beijing and in the subsequent UN’s Security 
Council Resolution 1325 in 2000 (which will be discussed in more depth shortly).29  
                                                 
24 Pinker, Better Angels, 684-689; see also True, ‘Winning the Battle’. 
25 Kristof and WuDunn, Half the Sky, p. xv. 
26 Andrea Cornwall, Jasmine Gideon, and Kalpana Wilson, ‘Introduction: Reclaiming 
Feminism: Gender and Neoliberalism’, IDS Bulletin, 39/6 (2008): p. 4. 
27 ibid. 
28 Kristof and WuDunn, Half the Sky, pp. xv, xxi, xxiv. 
29 Goldstein, Winning the War, p. 197. 
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More specific to the declinist argument is the work that links women’s status with 
regional security concerns.  Societies with a male ‘surplus,’ which is owed to social 
preference for male children leading to female foeticide and infanticide, higher 
childhood mortality rates in girls, and the abandonment of girls, are more secure 
societies.30  The ‘surplus’ population of men will lead to social instability because: 
men who are not provided the opportunity to develop a vested interest in a 
system of law and order will gravitate toward a system based on physical 
force, in which they hold an advantage over other members of society.31 
 
Hudson and Den Boer conclude that this particular population ‘are already at risk for 
establishing a system based on physical force in order to obtain by force what they 
cannot obtain legitimately’.32 The authors relies the classic binary: if women are both 
peaceable and pacifying, then without women men are brutish and nasty.  Without 
marriage, this population of men ‘may not transition from potential threats to potential 
protectors of society.33  Thus, gender imbalance must be taken seriously by 
government and regional actors.   
 
This argument is taken further by Hudson et al. in later work that correlates women’s 
insecurity, due to interpersonal violences, with state and regional instability.  They 
argue that ‘societies that are more gender-equal are less likely to go to war, to use 
                                                 
30 Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea M. Den Boer, Bare Branches: The Security 
Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004); 
Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea M. Den Boer, ‘A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace: 
Security and Sex Ratios in Asia's Largest States’, International Security, 26/4 (2002): 
pp. 10-11. 
31 Hudson and Den Boer, ‘A Surplus of Men’, pp. 21-22. 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid. 
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force during conflicts, or to be involved in violent international crises’.34  Gender 
inequality is owed simply to the ‘subordination’ of women to men in economic, 
physical, and social instances.35 The creation of gender equal societies is both a top-
down process encompassing family law, quotas, and including women in law-making 
practices36 and a bottom-up process of changing gendered norms and attitudes within 
society.37  
 
Bringing women into security and economic equations are reflected in the policy 
realm as well. The Hillary Doctrine was defined during Hillary Clinton’s tenure as 
Secretary of State under President Obama and it is assumed it will feature in her 
possible presidency.38  The Hillary Doctrine places both economic and physical 
security at the centre of foreign policy.  It originated in a 2010 TEDWomen’s 
conference talk in which then-Secretary Clinton argued: 
Let women work and they drive economic growth across all sectors. … Give 
women equal rights and entire nations are more stable and secure. Deny 
women equal rights and the instability of nations is almost certain.39 
 
The Hillary Doctrine fully encapsulates declinist feminisation: women’s economic 
development provides women with a social standing in their community that enables 
                                                 
34 Hudson et al., Sex and World Peace, pp. 3-4. 
35 ibid., chapter 1. 
36 ibid., chapter 5. 
37 ibid., chapter 6. 
38 Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, ‘The Hillary Doctrine’, Newsweek, 6 March 2011, 
http://www.newsweek.com/hillary-doctrine-66105, accessed 24 February 2016. 
39 CNN, ‘Hillary Clinton: Empower Girls and Women’, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/12/12/clinton.empower.girls/ accessed 24 
February 2016. 
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individual and communal security which is then correlated to regional and (possible) 
international security. 
 
Perhaps the most prominent place that one can see the feminisation argument in 
global politics today is in UNSCR 1325. It is considered a landmark document that 
works to secure women’s places  
in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-
building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict 
reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full 
involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and 
security.40   
 
However much lauded UNSCR 1325 was, it has also been the recipient of feminist 
criticism that is relevant to my later argument.  In short, the critique is that UNSCR 
1325 is beholden to a biological essentialist lens, where ‘gender has been interpreted 
as woman, and women remain differentiated from men’.41  In a conflict framework 
this means women are identified solely as ‘victims in need of protection’ and men ‘as 
protectors and policymakers’,42 and arguably, adversaries.   
 
This literature assumes the gender binary of man/masculinity or woman/femininity 
and often assumes gender is a variable that can be weighed.  Yet, there is another way 
of looking at gender, which is to see it as a structuring force, like race or class, and as 
                                                 
40 United Nations, ‘Landmark Resolution on Women, Peace and Security’, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/, accessed 24 February 2016. 
41 Susan Willett, ‘Introduction: Security Council Resolution 1325: Assessing the 
Impact on Women, Peace, and Security’, International Peacekeeping, 17/2 (2010), p. 
143. 
42 ibid. 
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something that makes assumptions not just about people but about places and 
ideologies.  These assumptions then structure people, society, and international 
politics.43  The neo-liberal paradigm of declinist literature rests upon modern Western 
propositions about what good governance and economic practices are and these are 
masculinist and assume heteronormativity (as discussed later).   
 
By presuming a gender binary and in reifying a gender hierarchy, things that fall 
outside of the binary and are thereby devalued in the hierarchy go unseen in the 
declinist literature.  Again, gender is not a binary but a spectrum.  When gender is 
conflated with women, the spectrum is unrecognised.  In this focused attention on 
women, violences and biases that are owed to gender politics, like those against the 
LBGTQI community, go unaddressed.  Such a conflation fails to see violence against 
this community is driven by heteronormative gender idealisations that harm this 
community in a multitude of ways.  Before fully engaging in the feminist critique, it is 
also necessary to work through how women have been used as the ‘standard bearers’ 
for progress, modernity, and perceptions of civilisation and how this erodes once we 
go beyond the man/masculine and woman/feminine binary.  
 
Holding the Light 
 
In Greek mythology, Medea is a powerful sorceress seduced by Jason to enable his 
quest for the Golden Fleece.  Different accounts deal with her actions during her 
relationship with Jason, which included Medea murdering her brother in order to 
overthrow or weaken their demigod father, King Aietes, and her two sons when Jason 
                                                 
43 Laura Sjoberg, Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). 
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left her for another woman.44  Medea’s story is complicated and thus Medea is a 
complicated ‘heroine.’  Her femininity is constantly called into question as her use of 
magic and possible position of power refuses to be hemmed in by the classic 
(stereotypical) behaviour of a passive yet supportive wife and nurturing mother.45  
Even though Jason, the archetypical (patriarchal) hero, needed Medea’s (unfeminine) 
power for his success, he was also put off by her strength.  It is no surprise then that 
upon discovering his infidelity she declares incredulously, ‘I made you victor/ I held 
the light that saved you’.46  
 
Why do I bring up Medea and Jason here?  Feminisation ‘holds the light’ of the 
declinist argument.  While I do not dispute the use of statistical analysis to 
demonstrate the decline of violence thesis, I do query the interior logistics of how the 
argument works, or in this case, potentially does not.  Currently, the declinist 
literature cannot account for two distinct possibilities that will undo feminisation.  
The first, and one that I will not spend time on in this paper, is that women are not 
necessarily more peaceful. Female heads of state can be just as aggressive, one only 
has to think of Margaret Thatcher or Golda Meir.  Women participate in genocide, 
torture, and terrorism.47  Second, gender cannot be hemmed in by conflating it with 
‘women’.48  Such a conflation will be the ultimate downfall of ‘feminisation’.  The 
better solution is to be more inclusive of all identities, particularly those on the 
                                                 
44 Emma Griffiths, Medea (London: Taylor and Francis, 2006): pp. 7-8. 
45 ibid., p. 5. 
46 as quoted in Edith Hamilton, Mythology (New York: Little, Brown, 1969 [1940]): 
p. 128. 
47 Caron E. Gentry and Laura Sjoberg, Beyond Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Thinking 
About Women’s Violence in Global Politics (London: Zed, 2015). 
48 Terrell Carver, Gender is not a Synonym for Women (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 
1996). 
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margins and the ones that lay outside of the gender binary of heterosexual 
idealisations.  
 
The critique I wish to raise here is that resting an argument on women’s status is not 
new and not without power dynamics.  The focus upon women’s empowerment is 
embedded in a larger dependency on Western masculinist thinking that de-prioritises 
the concerns of those on the margin.  While the focus on women should be welcomed, 
the focus on gender only works if the epistemological, if not ontological, 
arrangements of Western conceptions of society and governance remain 
unquestioned.  In other words, they only work if the heteronormative gender 
hierarchies remain in place.  The current gendered configuration is harmful as will be 
shown in the criticisms of UNSCR 1325 and development goals.  Other feminists 
have already critiqued Fukuyma’s argument presented above and declinist literature 
for failing to understand how gender structures impact the performativity of gendered 
behaviours.49  The section below utilises a post-colonial and gender lens to view 
declinist ‘feminisation’ from a different perspective.  It demonstrates that women and 
their position in a society have always served as the ‘light that saves’ particular socio-
political theses, from colonialism to the decline of violence.  Because of this, 
women’s rights, bodies, and lives become tools for the success of the project instead 
of ends in their own right.  Additionally, this ‘end’ means examining other forms of 
gender violence is no longer necessary. 
 
Civilisation, Progress, and Decline of Violence 
                                                 
49 J. Ann Tickner, ‘Why Women Can’t Rule the World: International Politics 
According to Francis Fukuyama’, International Studies Review, 1/3 (1999); True, 
‘Winning the Battle’. 
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The declinist literature is based on the assumption that ‘progress’ looks like specific 
notions of a desirable, good government and society, similar to Francis Fukuyama’s 
‘end of history’ argument.  The premise of Fukuyama’s thesis held that the liberal 
democratic West had won the Cold War and liberal democracy ‘remain[ed] the only 
coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the 
globe’. 50  
 
The idea of civilisational progress and its Western reliance upon democratic and 
capitalist participation is inherent within declinism.  The intolerance towards violence 
and violent solutions is owed to ‘civilisation, modernity, and Western society’.51  
‘Peaceable societies’ are ‘richer, healthier, better educated, better governed, more 
respectful of their women, and more likely to engage in trade’.52  Thus, there is a 
presumption within the declinist literature that the best way to achieve non-violence 
or more peace is via a particular form of government and economic organisation, one 
that is more specifically Western and holds very Western norms about what public 
life is meant to look like. 
 
Therefore, the rationale behind the declinist literature rests within a Eurocentric 
framework.  ‘End of history’, modernisation, economic progress, and (democratic) 
rights reside within Western understandings of how governments and economics are 
meant to be organised.  These may be the most statistically advantageous ways to 
arrange human life; nevertheless, the problem that arises is one where all other state 
                                                 
50 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1992): p. xiii. 
51 Pinker, Better Angels, p. xx. 
52 ibid., pp. xxi-xxii. 
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actors are compared to and are held in comparison with ‘Europe/The West’ and the 
seeming perfection contained therein.  Whereas I have critiqued the presumption 
within this literature that the West is nearly flawless, particularly in the advancement 
of women’s security, in a previous publication,53 the argument in this paper asserts it 
is problematic to hold women as the ‘proof’ of a state’s progress.  Women are the 
ones that hold the light. 
 
‘Europe’ operates as both a ‘master narrative’ and a ‘silent referent’.54  While there is 
not a singular understanding of ‘Europe’ nor one that holds up under academic 
scrutiny, there is nonetheless a concept ‘reified and celebrated in the phenomenal 
world of everyday relationships of power as the scene of the birth of the modern’.55  
When ‘philosophers and thinkers who shape the nature of social science’ attempt to 
produce ‘theories that embrace the entirety of humanity’ they are ‘produced in 
relative, and sometimes absolute, ignorance of the majority of humankind—that is, 
those living in non-Western cultures’.56  Europe is the theoretical premise upon which 
all studies are based and thus ‘all other histories are matter of empirical research that 
fleshes out a theoretical skeleton that is substantially “Europe”’.57 Another way of 
positing this argument is to recognise that if a singular ‘Europe’ cannot be said to 
exist outside of theoretical discussions of it, this ‘Europe’ borrows its ontological 
weight and significance of what it is not.  Chakrabarty argues that in the words of 
various European philosophers, Europe is not what is identified by Husserl’s 
descriptions of the ‘mythical-religious’ ‘oriental philosophies’; similarly, it is not the 
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‘prebourgeois’ or ‘precapital’ economies articulated by Marx.  Instead, in opposition 
to what exists outside of Europe, European philosophies enable scientific (rational) 
investigations and liberal economic progress.58  
 
Modernity and the modern stem from ‘ideas …[that] emerg[ed] out of the processes 
of economic and political revolution located in Europe’.59  Modernity is a binary 
discourse that was utilized by European colonisers to set themselves up as progressive 
and ‘non-Europeans as… “static” [and] “prehistorical”’.60 Therefore there is a 
‘tendency’ of reading non-Western histories ‘in terms of a lack, an absence, or an 
incompleteness that translates into “inadequacy”’.61 There are multiple forms of 
modernity that exist outside of Europe and within it as well.  As it is well known, 
colonialism and neo-imperialism were about exporting Western values, ideas, and 
epistemologies.62  When deliberating the non-West the modern is seen ‘as a known 
history, something which has already happened elsewhere, and which is to be 
reproduced, mechanically or otherwise, within a local content’ (emphasis true to 
text).63  Progress and/or modernisation are dependent upon what is assumed to already 
have happened in the European (and Western context): empowering capitalism that 
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works in tandem with full civil/human rights in functioning democracies.  Or in the 
presumption that the women/gender question is settled in the West. 
 
From this perspective, the West comes sweeping in with its need to ‘protect its little 
brown brothers’ or convert ‘heathens’ to Christianity or teach ‘dirty’ people basic 
hygiene.64  Makau Mutua identifies the Western actor as constructing itself as a 
saviour and the non-West as either a victim or a savage.65  Savages and victims’ 
agencies are both curtailed.  Savages ‘are presented as so cruel and unimaginable as to 
represent their state as a negation of humanity’66 whereas the victim is a ‘human 
being whose dignity and worth have been violated by the savage’.67  Finally, the 
saviour is truly the ‘better angel’:  
the saviour or the redeemer, the good angel who protects, vindicates, civilises, 
restrains, and safeguards. The saviour is the victim’s bulwark against tyranny.  
The simple, yet complex promise of the saviour is freedom: freedom from the 
tyrannies of the state, tradition, and culture.  But it is also the freedom to 
create a better society based on particular values.68 
Furthermore, ‘the saviour is the human rights corpus itself, with the United Nations, 
Western governments, INGOs, and Western charities as the actual rescuers, 
redeemers of a benighted world’ and ‘savage cultures and peoples’ exist outside of 
‘regime of political democracy’.69  In many ways then, the assumption of the 
necessity of feminisation to the decline of violence thesis operates unwittingly within 
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a Eurocentric paradigm where the European model of society and government is the 
model that can fix those in the non-West.   
 
Holding the Light in the Decline of Violence 
 
This Euro- or Western-centric paradigm is deeply gendered.  Guyatari Spivak’s 
renown phrase is apt: ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’.70  When 
Western colonial and neo-colonial interventions are made on the ‘behalf’ of women, 
those women become the standard bearers for modernity and progress.  The question 
of women’s empowerment in nineteenth-century India was a significant concern to its 
European colonisers, who believed that women’s rights stood as exemplars for the 
progression of the ‘modern individual, freedom, equality, and rights’.71  Women’s 
education and their living conditions became increasingly emphasised, seeing these as 
necessary for India’s progression into ‘modernity’.72 Yet this is clearly hypocritical 
and lacking critical self-awareness as ‘the women question’ was far from settled in the 
colonising states (and remains unsettled).   
 
Through the lens of post-colonialism, declinism’s claim that it is Western 
civilisational progress, with an emphasis on political organisation, political rights, and 
economic empowerment, looks all too familiar. When Chakrabarty’s critique is 
applied to declinist literature, feminisation becomes all the more suspect.  Women’s 
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positions in society, not women themselves, are manipulated to hold the light that 
saves a deeply Western discourse. 
 
When gender is conflated with women the prioritisation of this conflation is done in a 
way that may fail women and all other marginalised populations. The conflation 
erases nuance and intersectionality, where race, gender, class, sexuality, and so forth, 
all may interact to hold a person back.73  ‘Feminisation’ in practice, in policies like 
UNSCR 1325 or gender mainstreaming and inclusion in development work, is not 
without its challenges.  The earlier criticism of UNSCR 1325 argued that instead of 
1325 becoming a way of reworking UN (gendered) hierarchies and gendered 
practices, it simply became a way of re-inscribing them.74  Similarly, Carol Cohn, a 
feminist anti-militarist activist and scholar who runs 1325 training and workshops, 
has herself admitted she ‘fear[s]’ 1325’s focus on ‘Women-as-peacemakers’ and that 
it ‘leaves the dominant political and epistemological frameworks [of the UN] 
untouched’.75   
 
Women have become the face of development policies; the push to include women in 
development policies is referred to as ‘gender equality equals smart economics’.76 
This push is dependent upon the notion that since women represent 50 percent of the 
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world’s population, better inclusion of women in the economy just makes ‘smart 
economics’.  Sydney Calkin critically examines the World Development Report from 
2012 for this gendered concept of ‘smart economics’.  While Calkin applauds the 
‘acknowledgment of the intrinsic value of gender equality’ in the Report, much like 
Cohn’s appreciation of 1325, she feels it has been at the expense of critical, feminist 
interrogation of the ‘gendered nature of markets and the gendered harms of neo-
liberal policy’.77  Calkin ultimately argues that gender development initiatives that 
have received positive attention, ‘such as microcredit [and] conditional cash 
transfers’, only ‘wor[k] to discipline and control women’.78 Thus, even though the 
onus of these policies is ‘empowerment’ and autonomy, these policies also reinscribe 
problematic gender dynamics.   
 
Additionally, Cornwall, Gideon, and Wilson look at the inclusion of gender and 
women the neo-liberal institutions of the World Bank and the Department for 
International Development (DFID).  These two institutions ‘have…a growing interest 
in women’ even though they do not ‘grasp the concept of gender’.79 Because the 
development community does not share a common definition of empowerment, they 
often fail to change gendered structures and biases—thereby revealing this lack of 
gender-as-power awareness.80  Women are held by these organisations as ‘resourceful 
providers, reliable micro-entrepreneurs, cosmopolitan citizens, and positioned as 
“disposable domestics’”.81  Thus, when DFID articulates women as ‘a “weapon” in 
the fight against poverty’ they do so dependent upon the potentially harmful gender 
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norms that exist in those social contexts.82  These policies replicate gender structures 
that contain and constrain: women, due to their lack of mobility due to social and 
familial dependency, are construed as less risky and more reliable for loan repayment.  
Because women are more negatively affected by ‘shame’, they are less likely to skip 
payments and/or default entirely.83  Women’s positions then become a way for DFID 
to manipulate a better outcome itself, not the society. The perspective that women are 
more ‘reliable’ and ‘stable’ depends on an element of essentialism and takes 
advantage of how women are controlled and dependent in the local environment, thus 
the policies depend upon these harms and replicate them to their own end.  
Feminisation then replicates the gender hierarchy rather than dismantling it. 
 
An understanding of gender as a tool for power that operates similarly to class and 
race is in desperate need here.  The first step is to recognise that woman does not 
equal gender.84  The second step is to understand the hierarchical nature of gender 
does not just operate between individuals, but through organisations and institutions, 
structuring global politics.  In a gender hierarchical structure, masculine priorities 
come at the expense of feminine ones.  Even with lip service to gender and women’s 
positions, without an understanding of gender structures international politics will 
never move beyond masculine priorities.85  This is devalorisation, or the de-valuation 
of the feminine for the prioritisation of the masculine.  Declinism’s feminisation is 
falling into the same trap as modern Western thought due to its masculine 
underpinnings and conflation of women with gender. 
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Feminisation as Devalorisation 
 
IR scholarship, amongst other scholarship, has always valued masculine traits above 
feminine ones: rationality of capability over weakness (as well as the rationality of 
attitude over one informed by emotion); sovereignty over cooperation/dependency.86  
Therefore, the discourse of progress and good governance is not only Western-centric 
but inherently masculinist as well. To demonstrate this I will unpack the feminist 
understanding of ‘feminisation’. It is not enough to think that simply by ‘including’ 
women in policies, solutions, or measurements means that progress is being made.  
This is the assumption that Chakrabarty pointed out as a hypocritical fallacy.  Instead, 
a deeper grasp of what gender is and how it operates as a structure must be 
understood.  The declinist literature is not manipulating women’s positions but it is 
replicating gender dynamics when it fails to pay attention to certain violence, like 
structural violence, sexual and gender-based violence, and violence against sexual 
minorities.  
 
Ann Tickner begins her seminal text on gender and international relations by working 
through a critique of how Morgenthau transposes the rational man onto the state.  This 
has given mainstream IR scholars the presumption that states are (or ought to aspire to 
being) rational, sovereign actors.87  Yet, as Tickner points out, rationality and 
sovereignty are masculine attributes.88  In a logocentrism, such as the one that exists 
in the masculinity-femininity binary, one side is always valued over another.  
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Particular masculinities are valorised—rational, wealthy, white, heteronormative 
ones89; most if not all femininities are devalorised. 
 
The bias towards masculinity is what V. Spike Peterson refers to as feminisation.90  
Peterson clarifies that  
Gender is not simply an empirical category that refers to embodied men and 
women and their material activities but also a systematically analytical 
category that refers to constructions of [privileged] masculinity and 
[devalorised] femininity and their ideological effects (emphasis true to text).91 
 
She continues by adding that ‘the privilege and power attributed masculine qualities 
depends on the devalorisation of feminised qualities’ (emphasis true to text).92 The 
creation of gendered hierarchies depend on the ‘natural[isation], depolitical[isation], 
legitim[ated]…denigration of the feminine, and it is the feminisation of “others” that 
link multiple oppressions’.93  It is not that the declinist literature intends to oppress—
this is more than likely the opposite of what is desired—but that due to its 
devalorisation of particular violences, this is an unexpected outcome.  
 
Gender analysis can be used to undo feminisation.  Gender analysis, or utilising a 
gender lens, means paying attention to what is socially constructed as masculine or 
feminine.  Gender, like race or class, determines what is prioritised.94  This analysis 
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acknowledges that gender shapes more than people, it shapes organisations, 
institutions, and states.95 Some feminists see this as an apparatus, a la Althusser,96 and 
others see this a laddering of sorts, where competing masculinities vie for the 
hegemonic position.97   
 
Deprioritised Violences 
 
The critique of the implementation of ‘feminisation’ in UNSCR 1325 and 
development policies is illustrative here.  Instead of fundamentally changing how the 
structural gender inequalities, these policies reified them.  These policies 
fundamentally misunderstood what feminists believe gender to be.  They see gender 
as women, as an operational variable instead of as the aforementioned way of 
ordering people, organisations, and international hierarchies.  My fear is that a 
declinist understanding of ‘feminisation’ mirrors feminism’s ‘feminisation’.  It does 
so, in the first instance, by minimising, if not deprioritising, violences that are not 
combat-related.  In the second instance, by conflating gender with women and 
prioritising women’s rights, it fails to make actual change by challenging the very 
structures that subordinate women and other marginalised peoples.  By only seeing 
gender as ‘women’ it fails to see gender as a hierarchical structure that organises 
international relations98 (both in what is studied and how it is studied). 
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When declinist scholarship prioritises the statistical measurement of certain types of 
violence, particularly combatant death versus non-combatant death, it then fails to see 
other forms.  Specifically, John Gray criticises the declinist thesis for failing to 
recognise the deaths that happen under dictatorships or due to structural violence.99  
Equally, Jacqui True discusses how the declinist literature fails to account for and 
take seriously sexual and gender-based violence.100  This paper is concerned with how 
it deals with the rights and empowerment of marginalised people whose identity lies 
outside of the gender binary that declinist’s modern Western focus cannot account for. 
 
Feminisation in declinist scholarship is defined by rights, empowerment, and legal, if 
not social, recognition of these.  Feminisation in feminist literature is about the 
deprioritisation of what is seen as the feminine.  Feminisation in declinist literature 
thankfully takes individual security seriously, something feminist IR has championed 
for decades.  Yet, it only pays attention, seemingly, to certain people’s rights, mainly 
women in the conflation of women and gender.  This has led to an ignorance of the 
issues outlined above.  Yet, if we take Hudson’s argument in Sex and World Peace or 
Pinker’s ‘rights revolution’ argument seriously, it is not just legal rights that matter, 
but the personal security of marginalised individuals.  Since gender and gender 
identity is not a binary but a fluid and multifaceted spectrum, just looking at women 
as an indicator of changing norms or progress does not work.  It is not just that 
declinist feminisation scholars omit homosexuality (because Pinker includes 
homosexuality within his rights chapter), but that the rise of women cannot be a stand 
in for gender progress.  It has to be the rise of all people that ‘fail’ to live up to the 
hetero-masculine norms. 
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Among the many insecurities and violences we should then be very alarmed at 
includes the ongoing and quite likely rise of violence against the LGBTQ and HIV-
affected community in the US, Russia, and elsewhere.101  Even if LGBTQI rights are 
more secure, particularly in the West, they are still tenuous.  Furthermore, rights, like 
the legal right to marriage, says little about social acceptance and being free from 
mental and physical harm.  In order to illustrate the difference between secured rights 
and individual insecurity, the yearly publication of ‘The Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual 
Map of World Laws 2015’ by the ILGA is useful.102  The map colour codes each 
states based upon the strength or weaknesses of their laws recognizing gay rights.  
‘Recognition’ is shaded in green—the darkest (highest) green indicates the right to 
marry or full recognition of same-sex unions.  ‘Persecution’ is shaded in a red-scale 
that fades to yellow.  Additional symbols are added to various countries: an 
exclamation mark in a triangle indicates ‘anti-propaganda laws’; a question mark in a 
triangle indicates unenforced death penalties; and a shield indicates laws that prohibit 
discrimination.  Finally, a pale citrine colour is used to denote countries without 
specific legislation.   
 
Dark green states, those that recognize marriage or the equivalent, include all of North 
America, Uruguay, Argentina, Europe, Iceland, and South Africa.  Yellow countries 
with anti-propaganda, or homophobic or homonegative propaganda towards non-
binary people that encourages discrimination, but without other legislation 
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persecuting on the basis of sexual orientation is limited to Russia and Lithuania.  
Algeria and Nigeria are a pale red but with a warning of anti-propaganda laws.  India, 
Tanzania, and Guyana are a mid-tone red as they have laws that could mean 
imprisonment from 14 years to life for homosexual behaviour. The dark red states 
include Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, and 
Mauritania.  Afghanistan and Pakistan have a non-implemented death penalty 
whereas Iran’s death penalty is carried out by non-state actors.  Therefore, rights for 
the LGBTQI community are globally unsettled, but the main focus on ‘rights’ and 
particularly the securing of the right to marry are, in some ways, red herrings as the 
rights mask the continued violence against LGBTQI folk. 
 
The focus on violence against this community in the US is purposeful: the declinist 
argument tends to argue that rights equates to personal security; yet, even though the 
US has some of the most equitable LGBTQI laws in the world, the personal security 
of LGBTQI individuals is far from settled.  Violence against the LGBTQI community 
in the US has been marked by several stand-out instances: the police raid on the 
Stonewall Inn in New York City that led to the Stonewall riots in 1969 and the first 
Pride parades across the US the following year; the sexual assault and murder of 
Brandon Teena in 1993, a trans-man upon whom the movie Boys Don’t Cry is based; 
and the beating, torture, and death of Matthew Shepard in Wyoming in 1998.  While 
there are far more many incidents of hate violence against the LGBTQI community 
than these, the latest crystallising moment is the June 2016 mass shooting at the Pulse 
Orlando gay nightclub.  Forty-nine people were killed and another 53 were injured, 
making this the largest mass shooting in the US to date.  
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The Pulse shooting is often referred to as a hate crime against the LGBTQI 
community and hate crime against the community has been rising in the US.  Overall, 
‘[r]eported homicides against the LGBT community [in the US] have surged since 
2007’.103  A 2011 FBI analysis of hate-crime statistics revealed that ‘LGBT people 
are more than twice as likely to be the target of a violent hate-crime than Jews or 
black people’.104  In 2013 ‘sexual orientation motivated roughly 20 percent of hate 
crimes’ and ‘the only factor that accounted for more was race’.105  One of the most 
insecure groups are trans-people of colour and ‘hate-motivated violence against 
transgender people rose 13 percent’ in 2014.106  
 
An article that looks at hate crime against the LGBTQI community maintains that the 
violence has everything to do with social attitudes towards gay and non-binary 
sexualities.  For instance, ‘[i]n 2014, a majority of Americans said they believed gay 
sex is morally unacceptable’.107  Furthermore, ‘anti-LGBT groups form a plurality of 
hate groups’ according to the Southern Poverty Law Centre; these groups are mostly 
affiliated with ‘fundamentalist religious groups’.108  This is crucially important to 
recognize: because laws may change, rights may be secured, but that does not mean 
that the individual is any more safe.  While many LGBTQI folk felt that they could 
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report to the police, there is a perception that LGBTQ people of colour, gender non-
conforming, and youth ‘are disproportionality targeted by the police and subjected to 
traumatising forces of state violence’.  This leads to the reluctance to report violence 
to the police and, even when the violence is reported, either the victim or the police 
may not code it as a hate crime.109 
 
This discomfort shows up in the reporting of violent attacks.  More violence against 
LBGTQI individuals is reported in states that are often assumed to be ‘gay friendly’, 
such as California, Massachusetts, and New York.  These three states are ‘amongst 
the top ten [US] states with the highest rates of anti-gay hate crimes’ from 2003 to 
2013.110  States that are more often associated with conservative social values, such as 
Alaska, Wyoming, and Mississippi, reported zero-LGBTQI hate crime in the same 
time period.111  This could be owed to the community/individuals in ‘gay-friendly’ 
states being more willing to report this violence to the police and that the police take 
the violence seriously.112  Thus, the violence, the reporting of the violence, and the 
investigation of the violence is dependent upon social attitudes and dispositions 
towards the rights and lives of those within this targeted community. 
 
A response could be that while laws are changing, normative and attitudinal change 
are slower.  After all, President Obama only signed an Executive Order ‘outlawing 
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity for federal employees 
and contractors’ in July 2014 and the Supreme Court decision allowing for marriage 
equality only followed a year later.  Marriage-rights continue expand, but we are 
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warned that this must come with the assurance of other ‘fundamental rights’.113  As 
the National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs notes 
Those within the LGBTQ communities that live at the intersection of other 
marginalised identities continue to face disproportionate violence and 
discrimination—justice and equality for LBGTQ communities are innately 
connected to issues affecting communities of colour, immigrant communities, 
low-income communities, people with disabilities, and any others that face 
oppression through a history of systemic and structural barriers.114 
 
The point is that we cannot isolate one group’s status, mainly women, see it as 
improving, and say it is the bellwether or the ‘holder of light’ for a partial explanation 
of the decline of violence. Conflating women and gender is a trap.  It means we fail to 
fully contextualise and understand what gender is—more than women—and how it 
structures societies.  Heteronormative gender idealisations of individuals and how this 
idealisation should be reflected in laws are behind the violent targeting of the 
LGBTQI community in the US.  Even though feminisation is only one piece of the 
declinist argument, it pins its relevance to gender-as-represented-in-women and this 
very limited way of thinking about gender means that an entire breadth of violence is 
missed.  The way that feminisation is described in declinist literature, which is limited 
at best, and how the canon as a whole exceptionalises a particular idea of society and 
government indicates a very narrow perspective. 
 
Conclusion 
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The decline of violence thesis offers a new way of approaching war in international 
relations: as declining, becoming a thing of the past as humanity works towards a 
better peace.  Yet, the decline of violence is limited on what violence is included and, 
more specifically to this paper, how it understands gender.  Gender is not synonymous 
with women nor is it simply a variable to statistically analyse individual relations.  
Instead, gender is a structuring force, determining what is seen as relevant and 
necessary.  In this case, being gender-blind has meant that declinist literature has 
limited the definition of ‘feminisation’ to only encompass the rights and 
empowerment of women. 
 
It does so at the expense of minorities and marginalised groups.  If the feminisation 
argument holds that the more women rights are accounted for then the greater social 
stability and peace, then gender is not understood.  Because it is not understood, 
women stands in for gender.  The increasingly better position of women in the world 
is thus used as the exemplar for highlighting how rights are being secured worldwide.  
So when the rights of other gender/sexuality identities, like the LGBTQ community, 
are unsettled, and the fight for them unsettles society as witnessed in the violence 
against them, then feminisation and gender are seen to have failed.  What does this 
then do for the feminisation premise in declinist literature?     
 
I propose something rather challenging and potentially divisive.  Let’s drop the term 
‘feminisation’ from the literature, but adopt a more holistic and inclusive gender 
perspective.  The focus should instead be on the ‘rights revolution’, but instead of 
projecting that the West has all rights deficits resolved, let’s acknowledge where some 
immense problems and difficulties still lie in all regions and corners of the world.  For 
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instance, the US is not post-race nor is it post-homo-/trans-phobic.  There is still a 
long way to go in order to say that all members of US society have a secure place 
within it.  Once there is greater awareness of the pitfalls that exist in all countries, we 
can remove some of the harmful, gendered dynamics that are holding us back from 
achieving a deeper, lasting peace. 
